Comparative and supranational law

La presente rubrica si propone di fornire informazioni periodiche circa l’evoluzione della giurisprudenza CEDU in materia di diritto antidiscriminatorio.  Come noto le disposizioni interessate sono l’art. 14 della Convenzione, che prevede il divieto di discriminazione nel godimento dei diritti garantiti dalla stessa Convenzione, ed il protocollo 12 art. 1 (generale divieto di discriminazione). Quest’ultimo ha spettro applicativo più ampio (facendo riferimento al godimento di qualsiasi diritto previsto dalla legge), ma è stato ratificato da un numero ristretto di Stati, di cui non fa parte l’Italia.

The Author examines the main differences between the CJEU decisions in the Achibita and WABE cases, both of which relate to neutrality policies pursued by private employers that prohibit employees from displaying religious or political symbols. The A. argues that in the WABE decision, the Court: (1) requires for the neutrality policy to meet a genuine need on the part of that employer, which it is for the employer to demonstrate, taking into consideration the legitimate wishes of those customers or users and the adverse consequences that that employer would suffer in the absence of that policy, given the nature of its activities and the context in which they are carried out; (2) considers that such difference of treatment is appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that the employer’s policy of neutrality is properly applied, entailing such policy to be pursued in a consistent and systematic manner; (3) requires that the prohibition on displaying religious or political symbols is limited to what is strictly necessary having regard to the actual scale and severity of the adverse consequences that the employer is seeking to avoid by adopting that prohibition.

This paper examines the WABE judgment of the Court of Justice. The Author finds in the ruling a greater leeway awarded to national courts in balancing fundamental freedoms, while respecting the standards of equality set by EU law. Moreover, in the proportionality assessment, the relevance of freedom of enterprise to justify neutrality policies is decreased: such freedom prevails over the workers’ religious freedom only when, in the absence of a neutrality policy, the employer would suffer economic damages that must however be demonstrated. If such negative consequences are not proven, the neutrality policy is not objectively justified.

This study aims at describing the legal framework that relates discrimination to the world of artificial intelligence, with particular reference to the use of algorithms. The author analyzes the operation of these automatic machines within the decision-making processes of private and public actors, emphasizing the potential discriminatory effects resulting from such use.